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1 Introduction 
Social service delivery for the poor remains a major challenge for development effectiveness. 
While public-private alliances can represent a viable solution to improve the efficiency of social 
services, rigorous evidence of their impact is scarce throughout the developing world. This study 
contributes to the literature on social service delivery by examining the impact of a recent 
electronic payment system introduced by the Mexican government to distribute the flagship 
Oportunidades cash transfer programme.  
 
The electronic payment system was implemented by the National Savings and Financial Services 
Bank (BANSEFI), a state-own development bank, in partnership with a network of non-banking 
institutions known as L@ Red de la Gente (People’s Network) that includes credit unions, savings 
and credit associations (SAPs), savings and credit co-operatives (SACCOs), and microfinance 
institutions. 
 
Non-banking institutions in Mexico usually target rural and peri-urban communities, many of 
which are poor and with limited or no access to banking services. The fact that L@ Red de la 
Gente targets communities where the Oportunidades programme also operates, provided the 
opportunity to introduce a pilot project in which a sub-sample of Oportunidades’ beneficiaries 
received their income entitlements through electronic transfers in banks accounts in non-banking 
institutions. Most Oportunidades participants continued to receive payments in cash through 
distribution points located in the nearest town. This study takes advantage of the availability of a 
rich household-level dataset (BANSEFI-SAGARPA Panel Survey 2004-2007) that was collected 
by BANSEFI and the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and 
Food (SAGARPA), during the phasing-in, and roll-out process of the electronic payment 
programme, to construct a quasi-experimental evaluation design.  
 
More precisely, we exploit as an exogenous rule the fact that the selection of participation in the 
electronic transfer programme was made by the managers of L@ Red de la Gente and the 
Oportunidades programme and not the households themselves, to rule out potential endogeneity 
problems, and use the variation in observables to carry out a matching-based impact analysis. In 
particular, we investigate the four-year impact of the electronic transfer programme on savings 
decisions, transaction costs, and coping strategies against idiosyncratic risks. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study of financial innovation in social service delivery to the poor in 
Mexico.  
 
The results indicate that households who received their transfer in a bank account decreased 
their participation in informal saving arrangements, increased the frequency of remittance 
reception, and were more likely to use their savings to cope with idiosyncratic shocks. We also 
find a degree of outcomes heterogeneity, which seems to be contingent upon the environments 
that characterize rural vs. urban areas in Mexico.1  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the theoretical background; 
Section 3 provides contextual details and describes the electronic payment system; Sections 4 and 
5 contain information on the data and the estimation methods. Section 6 presents both a 
                                                
1 We refer to ‘urban’ areas in contexts of peri-urban and marginalized neighbourhoods. It is therefore, not 
uncommon to observe ‘urban’ dwellers living in houses without concrete floor or walls. See Bazán et al. (2005) for 
further details. 
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discussion on the results and a sensitivity analysis, while Section 7 concludes with some 
reflection on policy. 
2 Background 
The importance of financial development and financial inclusion for growth and poverty 
reduction has been explored extensively in the Economics literature (see Deaton 1990; Giné and 
Townsend 2004; Burgess and Pande 2005; Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2008; Karlan and Morduch 
2009). Several studies stress the unconventional forms of savings by the poor, and the need for 
taking such forms into account when financial inclusion interventions are designed and 
implemented. For example, Deaton (1990) explains that consumption-smoothing and insurance 
motives are very often the reasons behind the savings accumulated by low-income households. 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008) highlight the importance of having access to financial services such 
as payments and transfers instruments linked to remittances. 
 
Financial innovation can also play a key role in promoting financial development and broadening 
financial inclusion. While the traditional view links the poor to a limited savings capacity due to 
resource constraints, more recent evidence also suggests that there are other important factors 
associated with inter alia, household intertemporal preferences, information asymmetries, 
transaction costs, intra- and inter-household dynamics and resource constraints. These factors 
require a different set of policy tools and tailored financial instruments to respond more 
effectively to the needs of the poor (Karlan et al. 2013). 
 
It is not unusual for the poor to exhibit ‘present-biased time preferences’, which hinders their 
willingness and ability to save. Attaching more importance to present consumption reduces 
future consumption and results in under-saving (Laibson 1997; Gul and Pesendorfer 2004; and 
Fudenberg and Levine 2006). These inter-temporal choices are affected by a factor that increases 
with the length of consumption delays. Present-biased individuals seem to be more likely to have 
higher credits and debts (Meier and Sprenger 2010). This may be due to a ‘self-control’ problem, 
whereby immediate needs are perceived as more urgent and relevant; this is likely to be more 
pronounced the lower the income levels (Thaler and Shefrin 1981; Can and Erdem 2013). 
 
‘Rational inattention’ can also result in lower savings (Karlan et al. 2011; Luo and Young 2010). 
If individuals fail to plan expenditures, and to smooth consumption accordingly, due to 
imperfect information, they may be forced to resort to undesired financial responses when 
resources are needed. These responses may involve debt contraction, debt default, or 
consumption reduction.  
 
Intra- and inter-household allocation dynamics can play an important role too. Intra-household 
co-operative disequilibria associated with e.g. conflict or disagreement between partners 
surrounding consumption decisions can influence households’ saving decisions. In Kenya, for 
example, Schaner (2013) found that couples with similar saving attitudes and preferences are 
much more likely to pursue utility-maximizing saving strategies. Anderson and Baland (2002) 
find that participation in informal group savings such as Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations (ROSCAs) is related to women’s bargaining power. In particular, they note that 
women with little bargaining power participate more in ROSCAs to avoid their husbands 
appropriating their savings for immediate consumption. Inter-household dynamics involving 
extended family pressure for income and asset sharing, may also discourage the accumulation of 
savings (Castilla 2013; Platteau 2000).  
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When self-control or intra- and inter-household dynamics are an issue, saving commitments or 
incentive instruments have proved to be an effective solution (Ashraf et al. 2006; Ashraf et al. 
2010; Brune et al. 2013). They facilitate financial planning, and offer the possibility to guard 
savings or hide them away. In this way, immediate consumption is discouraged, and both partner 
and family pressures are relieved. Instruments of this type can be explicitly tied to an incentive 
and retribution mechanism, or they can involve an implicit encouragement element. For 
example, Dupas and Robinson (2013) showed that, although no interest rate was provided, the 
street vendors targeted by their intervention chose to hold money in a savings bank account only 
to avoid appropriation by spouses or relatives. 
 
Resource constraints are another important factor to consider, with the co-existence of supply-
side and demand-side considerations. On one hand, limited access to, or long distances to 
branches of financial institutions represents a supply-side constraint which translates into 
transaction and opportunity costs for clients. On the other hand, low-income households’ 
inability to pay the fees attached to the use of formal financial services limit the demand for such 
services. A number of policy strategies have aimed to tackle these constraints. For example, 
Townsend (2006) reports that village-based small scale financial institutions play an important 
role in increasing households’ asset ownership in Thailand. Klein and Mayer (2011), found that 
the mobile-based transaction system M-PESA, developed by Safaricom in Kenya, considerably 
cut transaction and opportunity costs for the poor, while at the same time increasing their 
exposure and familiarity with financial innovation.  
 
Also in Kenya, Schaner (2011) found that the availability of ATMs increased transactions and 
saving balances, as clients could avoid having to visit bank branches in order to perform financial 
operations. Arestoff and Venet (2011) analysed the introduction of ‘Orange-money’ in 
Madagascar; which provided mobile-based deposit and transfer services. They found no impact 
on deposit rates, but showed that the frequency of remittances considerably increased for 
‘Orange-money’ clients. In Malawi, Flory (2011) found an increase in the rate of new bank 
account openings, following the introduction of a ‘bank-on-wheel’ service. The latter aimed to 
reach out for the unserved population lacking access to financial services, and the impact of the 
intervention was stronger the longer the travelling distance faced by households. 
 
In the specific case of Mexico, Aportela (1999) reports evidence from a natural experiment 
involving the opening of new branches of a government banking institution, Panhal, between 
1993 and 1994. The expansion used post offices to reach out to the unbanked in Mexico, and it 
was successful in raising savings levels, especially among lower income households. Aportela 
finds, however, that no substitution or displacement of informal saving mechanisms occurred. 
Bruhn and Love (2009) analysed the opening of Banco Azteca, which, with over 800 branches in 
2002, specifically targeted low-income households. The opening of Banco Azteca promoted the 
creation and survival of informal businesses. The bank was able to act as a lender for informal 
businesses after the introduction of alternative collateral requirements which were more suited to 
low-income clients.  
 
More closely related to our study is the study where Woodruff and Martinez (2008) considered 
the impact of the Mexican ‘Program to Strengthen the Popular Credit and Saving Sector’, 
launched in 2004. They find an increase in the penetration of non-banking financial institutions 
between 2004 and 2007. The latter, however, took place mainly among households with 
relatively higher incomes, leading to the conclusion that the diffusion of financial services among 
the poor still represents a pressing development concern in Mexico. Finally, Seira (2010) analyse 
the transaction flows related to the Oportunidades electronic payment intervention considered in 
our study. Seira’s transaction flow data was recorded only for the subset of beneficiaries who 
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already received payments via debit cards at the time. The study shows that the banked 
beneficiaries did not withdraw the whole sum corresponding to their Oportunidades transfer and 
saved part of it in the account, suggesting that low income households in Mexico do save when 
appropriate financial instruments are provided to them. 
3 Context and intervention 
Oportunidades (before known as Progresa) is Mexico’s flagship antipoverty social protection 
programme. It was launched in August 1997 to cover 300,700 households in 6,344 rural 
municipalities. By 2013, the programme supported nearly six million households living in 
109,852 marginalized rural, peri-urban and urban localities (Oportunidades 2013). Its objective is 
to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty by enhancing the development of human 
capabilities through education, health, and nutrition. Oportunidades provides income 
supplements to poor families in exchange for certain commitments, such as regular school 
attendance and periodic health clinic visits (Niño-Zarazúa 2011). 
 
Oportunidades’ income supplements were initially paid in cash at distribution points located in 
towns. This usually entailed long travelling and queuing times for recipient households. The 
repercussions were also in terms of opportunity cost for leaving their economic activities 
unattended, as well as endangered personal safety, as collectors carrying cash were exposed to 
the risk of theft and assault (Klein and Mayer 2011). The electronic payment system analysed in 
this study is the result of a joint effort that began in 2003 by the Secretariat of Social 
Development (SEDESOL), the Oportunidades National Co-ordination Unit, BANSEFI and non-
banking institutions affiliated to L@ Red de la Gente. Two central objectives guided the policy: 
first, to make the delivery of Oportunidades grants more efficient, by cutting transaction and 
opportunity costs for beneficiary households, and second, to broaden the limited financial 
inclusion in the country. 
 
Data on financial inclusion collected by the National Banking and Securities Commission in 2006 
showed a very limited financial penetration in rural and peri-urban communities. Financial 
inclusion rates were slightly higher in the urban sector, with just 26 per cent of urban households 
being banked (Honohnan 2008). This was in line with early findings by Caskey et al. (2006) that 
reported that only 24 per cent of households in Mexico City had access to formal financial 
services provided by either banking or non-banking institutions. A census conducted by 
BANSEFI in 2002 also found that the non-banking sector―integrated by about 630 institutions 
with nearly four million clients—had a market penetration rate of only 17 per cent (Gavito 
2002).2  
 
BANSEFI’s distribution network achieved a broad national coverage, thanks to its nearly 500 
branches across the country and the partnership with L@ Red de la Gente. The network 
specifically targeted rural and peri-urban localities, with limited access to financial services, and 
where most of Oportunidades’ beneficiaries live. At the end of the pilot intervention, L@ Red de 
la Gente had already served more than 700 municipalities, and by 2010, it had achieved 80 per 
                                                
2 Non-banking institutions in Mexico include credit unions, savings and credit associations (SAPs), savings and 
credit co-operatives (SACCOs), microfinance institutions. Credit unions have formally operated in Mexico since the 
creation of the National Banking Commission in 1924. Their original objective was to form syndicates of producers 
and small firms to distribute direct credits and technical assistance from development banks and other governmental 
agencies. SAPs are non-profit organizations with open membership. As in the case of credit unions, financial 
operations within SAPs are constrained to receive deposits and give credits to their members. CAPs are 
organizations that operate under a set of simple principles: i) one person, one vote; ii) no returns on capital, and iii) 
the use of profits for social purposes. SAPs as well as CAPs usually operate in rural and peri-urban areas. 
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cent of national coverage. The pilot intervention involved the opening of bank accounts for 
Oportunidades beneficiaries in non-banking institutions that formed part of L@ Red de la Gente. 
Oportunidades accounts were free of opening and maintenance fees. The design of the 
intervention meant that travelling distance and associated costs were substantially reduced for 
treated households. Seira (2010) has reported that as the result of the electronic payment system, 
the opportunity and financial costs for rural households associated with the collection of 
Oportunidades decreased by 77 per cent and 98.5 per cent, respectively.3  
4 Data 
In 2004, BANSEFI and SAGARPA began a household panel survey in 25 of Mexico’s 32 federal 
states. The survey covered 5,768 households, clients and non-clients of non-banking institutions. 
The sampling frame was designed to be representative at three regions: north, centre and south, 
from which a sample of non-banking institutions was randomly selected with a probability 
proportional to their number of clients (Woodruff 2006). For each of the selected branches, 
about 20 to 30 households were randomly selected from a listing of clients, while an equal 
number of households with no recorded use of formal financial services in the previous five 
years to the survey were also included. The results showed that 2,647 households had savings 
accounts while the remaining 3,141 households had not. 
 
The survey was then repeated for another three rounds, in 2005, 2006, and 2007, for a total 
number of 17,680 observations. For the purpose of this study, we retain only those households 
that between 2004 and 2007 were Oportunidades beneficiaries. This is a subset of the overall 
sample, and it amounts to 6,218 observations when pooled over the four years. Of these, 211 
observations were discarded due to inconsistencies in the reported modalities of cash transfer 
delivery, which left us with 6,007 observations.4 
 
An additional 2,746 observations were excluded, at this stage, because they identified households 
who switched from cash to electronic transfers only after the beginning of the intervention in 
2003. While in principle it is interesting to investigate the impact of the intervention on this 
subset, for the purpose of our analysis we will only focus on the group of ‘always compliers’. 
This is in order to retain comparability, given that the year of switching differs from household 
to household, and the differential in exposure to treatment would bias the impact estimate. 
Retaining only the households that receive Oportunidades via either of the same delivery method, 
whenever surveyed, leaves us with 3,261 observations in total.  
 
In addition, we dropped an additional 258 households that appeared only in the baseline survey. 
This was due to the decision by BANSEFI to substitute these with new households, clients of 
microfinance institutions. This leaves us with a final sample of 3,003 observations. Of these, 
1,806 received the Oportunidades grant via electronic transfers whereas 1,197 did it in cash. 
Given the data requirements for the matching-based quasi-experimental impact evaluation 
presented below, we employ the pooled sample over the four years. By doing this, we obtain 
                                                
3 When transfers had to be collected in cash at the nearest distribution point, the figures for rural beneficiaries 
indicated an average time allocation of four hours, corresponding to an opportunity cost of 17 pesos, and an average 
travelling expense of 30 pesos. These costs go down to half an hour of time allocation, corresponding to an 
opportunity cost of 2.22 pesos, and 0.5 pesos for travelling expenses, on average, after the pilot implementation. 
4 In particular, throughout the length of this pilot, Oportunidades beneficiaries could receive their income transfer 
via two delivery modalities only: either in cash or via a bank account. Some households reported payments in kind, 
though a cheque, or mentioned other methods. When these inconsistencies could not be resolved by cross-checking 
with other questions that helped detect mistakes attributable to enumerators’ transcription, the observations were 
dropped. 
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robust estimates although at the cost of being unable to exploit the time dimension, the impact 
of which we are not able to disentangle. 
 
Four outcome variables are considered, which are summarized in Table 1: the first is a binary 
variable, tandas, taking the value of one for households that participate in informal rotating saving 
associations, known in Mexico as tandas. Only slightly more than 10 per cent of our sample used 
tandas in the 12 months prior to the survey. This is explained by the socio-economic profiles of 
the sampled households. Budget constraints are likely to partly explain the low participation of 
Oportunidades beneficiaries in tandas, which require a commitment to a fixed sum of money for a 
given period. Homesavings is a binary indicator that takes the value one if the household keeps 
part or all its savings at home. Table 1 shows that, on average, 30 per cent of the households 
kept money at home in the 12 months prior to the survey. 
 
Remittances measures the frequency with which households receive remittances during the year. 
This variable has been transformed into log-form although it is presented in Table 1 on a linear 
scale for informative purposes. ShockCoping is a binary indicator recording whether a household 
has used its own savings to cope with idiosyncratic shocks. 15 per cent of the sample reported to 
have used their savings as a coping strategy. Idiosyncratic shocks include calamities associated 
with injuries, illness, or death of a household member, the job loss experienced by a household’s 
member, a drop in either the price or the quantity of the produce sold by the household, and the 
loss or damage of tools and machinery used for economic activity.  
 
Table 1: Pre-intervention characteristics and summary statistics 
 
Variable Mean 
(C) 
St. Dev. 
(C) 
Mean 
(T) 
St. Dev. 
(T) 
Pval 
T=C 
Obs. Total 
Outcomes       
Tandas 0.112 0.315 0.108 0.311 0.772 2997 
HomeSavings 0.307 0.461 0.306 0.46 0.923 2995 
Remittances 0.748 2.817 0.592 2.618 0.119 2997 
ShockCoping 0.152 0.36 0.14 0.348 0.936 629 
       
Covariates       
LocalType 0.286 0.452 0.408 0.491 0.000*** 2997 
LocalSize 0.103 0.304 0.06 0.238 0.000*** 2637 
North_Mexico 0.115 0.319 0.227 0.419 0.000*** 2997 
South_Mexico 0.644 0.478 0.58 0.493 0.000*** 2997 
Centr_Mexico 0.239 0.427 0.191 0.393 0.002*** 2997 
HouseProperty 0.814 0.388 0.8 0.399  0.355 2996 
HouseFloor 0.724 0.446 0.818 0.385 0.000*** 2997 
PipedWater 0.79 0.407 0.857 0.349 0.000*** 2997 
DepRatio 1.167 0.954 1.067 0.886 0.005*** 2810 
Age 47.86 14.7 48.97 15.54  0.05** 2994 
Sex 0.118 0.389 0.119 0.401  0.394 2997 
Education 1.18 0.385 1.206 0.404    0.082* 2988 
MaritalStatus 0.814 0.388 0.798 0.401    0.279 2995 
Indigenous 0.262 0.44 0.44 0.496 0.000*** 2982 
IdioShock 0.25 0.427 0.193 0.394 0.002*** 2996 
 
Notes: * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Source: Authors. 
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The survey questionnaire provides data on a number of household- and location-covariates. For 
all of them, Table 1 reports both summary statistics on the mean difference between the 
treatment and control groups. Only the covariates associated with statistically significant 
differences have been included in the estimation of the Mahalanobis distance metric and 
propensity score discussed in section 5. 
 
The ability to compare outcomes between the treatment and control groups critically depends on 
the selection process of the electronic transfer programme. Since the main criterion for 
participation in the programme was that the Oportunidades beneficiaries lived within the 
catchment area served by a branch of the non-banking institution, and given that the decision to 
join L@ Red de la Gente was made by the managers of the non-banking institutions, and not the 
households themselves, who had no power to accept, reject, or request the bank account, we rule 
out any potential endogeneity problem arising from household self-selection. Thus, the treatment 
group arguably differ to the control group only in that those receiving the electronic transfer of 
Oportunidades experienced a reduction in the associated costs of receiving the grant in cash. 
 
Nonetheless, we cannot rule out the presence of endogeneity problems if systematic 
heterogeneity exists in terms of available infrastructure and services within the locations, and 
between the areas—being these rural, peri-urban or urban—where the treatment and control 
groups live.  
 
Table 1 indicates that treated households are significantly more likely to be located in urban and 
peri-urban areas, which measured by the LocalType variable, and in northern regions (measured 
by North_Mexico). The Southern and Central regions exhibit a higher prevalence of rural areas, 
while northern Mexico, despite being less densely populated, has a higher urbanization rate. At 
the same time, it is worth noting that the probability of being treated is marginally lower in larger 
localities; here the size of the locality is measured by LocalSize which takes the value zero for 
small and very small localities and one for medium-size or big localities. This reflects the socio-
economic profiles of Oportunidades beneficiaries, who are less likely to reside in large urban 
agglomerations. 
 
A number of household-level covariates also exhibit statistical difference from zero. For 
example, the presence of piped water in the house and whether the house floor is made of 
concrete. It appears that treated households enjoy better infrastructural quality levels. Similarly, 
treated household are less likely to have experienced an idiosyncratic shock of the types 
described above, which may again be associated with differences in environmental settings. 
Finally, dependency ratios are only marginally lower in treated households.5 Heads of treated 
households tend to be marginally older and more educated, although the difference is only 
statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. They are, however, more likely to speak an 
indigenous language.  
 
Overall, the covariate distribution between the two groups suggests that there may be sources of 
upward or downward bias, with the direction of the bias depending on the outcome analysed. 
Therefore, we adopt a methodology that allows us to control for these sources of bias. The next 
section presents the methodology in more detail. 
                                                
5 The dependency ratio estimated here is adjusted to treat household members who did not contribute to household 
income as dependents. For example, adults who reported to be students and had no other occupation were classified 
as dependents; but adults aged 65 and older who reported to work, were not. 
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5 Methodology 
For comparative purposes, it is useful to begin our exposition by considering the case of a simple 
linear ordinary least squares (OLS) model, in which control variables alongside the impact 
variable, i.e. the treatment measure are regressed on the outcomes of interest. The linear OLS 
specification is depicted as: 
 
(1) 	ݕ௜ = ߙ + ܦ௜ߚ + ௜ܺߛ + ߝ௜ 
 
where ܦ௜ is a dummy variable taking the value one for households receiving Oportunidades via 
electronic payments and zero, in cash, whereas ௜ܺ is a vector of household- and location-level 
characteristics as described in Table 1. OLS estimates simply compare average outcomes 
between treatment and control groups after controlling for the effect of covariates. 
Shortcomings of this approach clearly arise from model misspecification as well as the risk of 
overlooking the potential effect of observed and unobserved heterogeneity affecting the 
outcomes of interest. A partial step towards addressing observables heterogeneity is the 
estimation of a fully interacted linear model (FILM), which relaxes the homogeneity assumption 
and allows for interactions of all control variables with the treatment status: 
 
(2) 	ݕ௜ = ߙ + ܦ௜ߚ + ௜ܺߛ + ( ௜ܺ ∗ ܦ௜)ߜ + ߝ௜  
 
If statistically significant interaction terms are found, impact heterogeneity can be regarded as an 
issue. In such cases, only comparable individuals should be considered to estimate treatment 
effects. For that purpose, matching estimators based on the propensity score or other distance 
metrics can be used to construct a synthetic quasi-experimental counterfactual. More formally: if 
we let ݕ௜ଵ denote the outcome of household ݅ when treatment occurs (ܦ௜ = 1) and ݕ௜଴ the 
outcome of a control household, with	ܦ௜ = 0, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) 
corresponds to ݕതଵ −	ݕത଴ , where each outcome is averaged over the respective population. Under 
such a setting, a number of covariates in ܺ allow us to balance the distribution of those 
determinants across treated and control groups using matching estimation methods. Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) show that this can be achieved by matching directly on the covariates, or by 
matching on the propensity score, which is calculated as the probability of treatment given a set 
of ܺ covariates. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) argue that propensity score methods provide the 
coarsest balancing score, whereas covariate matching provides the finest balancing score. Zhao 
(2004) explains, however, that, while matching on covariates removes all covariate differences 
and bias directly, such approach is impractical when there are many covariates because of the 
curse of dimensionality. Typically, in these situations a metric is needed to combine the multiple 
covariates into a scalar.  
 
A metric that is often adopted for its desirable properties is the Mahalanobis distance metric. As 
discussed in Rubin (1980), the Mahalanobis metric matching is an equal per cent bias reducing 
(EPBR) technique; where by bias we refer to the difference between the covariate mean of the 
treated and that of the control group. EPBR techniques reduce per cent bias equally on all 
covariates, while no covariate’s bias increases due to matching. The Mahalanobis metric 
minimizes the distance between treated unit ݅ and control unit ݆ as follows: 
 
          (3) 
								
	݀(݅, ݆)ெ = ൫ ௜ܺ௞ − ௝ܺ௞൯′ܦିଵ( ௜ܺ௞ − ௝ܺ௞) 
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where ܺ identifies ݇ matching covariates and ܦିଵ is the variance covariance matrix of ܺ. The 
Mahalanobis metric assigns weights to each co-ordinate of ܺ in inverse proportion to the 
variance of that co-ordinate. By applying the mahalanobis distance metric, the control unit with 
the minimum distance ݀(݅, ݆)ெ is chosen as a match for each treated unit. Following this 
procedure, matches are found for each treated unit, which are similar under all other respects (i.e. 
covariate characteristics) but for their treatment status. As a result, it is possible to attribute any 
measured difference in the outcomes of interests to the treatment itself. The estimation is only 
performed within the boundaries of the common support region, defined as the region within 
which comparable treatment and control units lie. All treated units for which ݀(݅, ݆)ெ cannot be 
minimized fall outside of the common support, and are thus excluded from the matching. In this 
setting, the ATT corresponds to: 
 
         (4) ܣܶܶ = ܧ[ݕଵ|ܶ = 1, ݀(݅, ݆)ெ] − ܧ[ݕ଴|ܶ = 0, ݀(݅, ݆)ெ] 
or 
          (5) ܣܶܶ		 = ܧ[ݕଵ − ݕ଴|݀(݅, ݆)ெ] 
 
In order to test for the sensitivity of our results, three different matching algorithms are 
estimated and presented in Tables 3 to 5. In all cases, the standard errors are calculated according 
to Abadie and Imbens’ (2006) analytical asymptotic variance formula. The first set of results is 
that of a nearest neighbour matching estimation in which treated observations are only matched 
to the closest untreated neighbour. Here, the size of the caliper is the key parameter measuring 
proximity (Cochran and Rubin 1973). Results are also presented for a weighted smoothed kernel-
based matching, where, rather than relying on the closest match, the counterfactual estimation is 
based on the whole data distribution on which a weighting structure is imposed. Such weighting 
structure corresponds to the kernel function (the Epanechnikov, in our case), which attributes 
progressively lower weights the larger the distance between the matched observations. In 
practice, the choice of the kernel is often unimportant; the bandwidth, instead, plays a role 
similar to the caliper described above.  
 
After estimating the nearest neighbour and kernel matching described above, we verified the 
covariate distribution balancing and the mean bias reduction achievement, with the post-
estimation routines detailed in Leuven and Sianesi (2003). It is important to note that we 
calibrate caliper and bandwidth restrictions according to such bias reduction performance. There 
is always a trade-off between bias elimination and the amount of observations retained. Although 
with closer matches better balancing is achieved, this comes at the expense of external validity. 
In all instances, we choose the least restrictive caliper and bandwidth which allow us to get rid of 
all bias. Figures A1-A24 in the Appendix provide some helpful visual representation of the bias 
reduction achieved. While both the nearest neighbour and kernel based estimators relied on the 
Mahalanobis distance metric described earlier, the last set of results presented in Tables 3 to 5 
use the nearest neighbour bias-adjusted Abadie and Imbens’ (2011) estimator. Here, the distance 
metric corresponds to: 
 
          (6) ݀(݅, ݆)஺ூ = ൫ ௜ܺ௞ − ௜ܺ௝൯݀݅ܽ݃(ܦିଵ)( ௜ܺ௞ − ௜ܺ௝) 
 
This metric is similar to the Mahalanobis distance, except for the weighting matrix adopted. In 
fact, while ݀(݅, ݆)ெ is weighted by the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of ܺ, ݀(݅, ݆)஺ூ is 
weighted by a diagonal matrix, with the inverse of the variances of the ܺ’s as its elements. The 
bias-correction algorithm proposed in Abadie et al. (2004) and Abadie and Imbens (2011) allows 
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to overcome the finite sample bias deriving from non-exact matching. The correction adjusts the 
difference between the matches with the differences in their covariate values, without affecting 
the asymptotic variance. We use a propensity score-based adjustment. In addition to this, to 
improve overlap, we follow Crump et al. (2009) and Abadie and Imbens (2011) and restrict the 
matching region to the subset of observations with 0.1 < ݌(ܼ) < 0.9; where ݌(ܼ) denotes the 
propensity score. Crump et al. (2009) calculate the percentage propensity score distribution (ߙ) 
to be dropped according to a condition based on the marginal distribution of the propensity 
score. They establish a rule of thumb for the parameter ߙ to be fixed at 0.1. 
 
Before moving to the results, we recall that any threat of violating the Conditional Independence 
Assumption (CIA) due to endogeneity from household self-selection is ruled out, although local-
level heterogeneity remains an issue. To address this shortcoming, we will follow two strategies. 
First, we include in the set of matching covariates all those for which a statistically significant 
difference between treatment and control groups exists. This includes the geographical location 
variables and the rural/urban location identifier. Second, we separate rural from urban localities 
and re-estimate the model by matching only households within each area separately. As 
explained in List et al. (2003), this is the matching analogy to the fixed effects estimator, which 
removes any location-related unobservable not already controlled for by the distance metric. In 
addition, such estimator satisfies an important condition set out in Smith and Todd (2005), 
namely, that, for treated and non-treated units to be comparable they should reside in the same 
local markets. Once this further condition is imposed, the ATT in (5) becomes: 
 
         (7) ܣܶܶ = ܧ[ݕଵ|ܶ = 1, ݀(݅, ݆)ெ, ݈݋ܿ] − ܧ[ݕ଴|ܶ = 0, ݀(݅, ݆)ெ, ݈݋ܿ] 
or 
         (8) ATT	= E[yଵ − y଴|d(i, j)୑, loc]						 
where ݈݋ܿ corresponds to the rural-urban identifier.  
6 Results 
6.1 OLS and FILM estimation 
The OLS and FILM results obtained from equations (1) and (2), respectively, are presented in 
Table 2 for exposition purposes only. The OLS estimates are unreliable due to the fact they do 
not address the concerns related to the common support and heterogeneity in observables. A 
first step towards correcting for this constraint is to estimate a FILM regression. As it is apparent 
for all outcome variables in Table 2, apart from the case in which we consider coping 
mechanisms to idiosyncratic shocks, there is significant impact heterogeneity. This is signalled by 
the significance of some of the elements contained in the interaction vector.  
 
More specifically, there is evidence of regional heterogeneity, with treated households living in 
southern regions being more likely to participate in tandas but less likely to save at home. 
Households living in central and southern regions also show a lower frequency of remittance 
reception; the same holds for households in urban areas, those belonging to indigenous groups, 
and those who suffer idiosyncratic shocks.  
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Table 2: OLS and FILM estimation  
 
 Tanda  HomeSaving Remittances ShockCoping 
 (1) 
OLS 
     (2) 
   FILM 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
FILM 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
FILM 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
FILM 
Treatment (D) 0.01 
(0.014) 
0.01 
(0.014) 
-0.029 
(0.02) 
-0.029 
(0.02) 
-0.008 
(0.142) 
-0.008 
(0.142) 
0.05 
(0.034) 
0.05 
(0.034) 
LocalType 0.036*** 
(0.014) 
0.036*** 
(0.014) 
0.006 
(0.02) 
0.006 
(0.02) 
-1.045*** 
(0.128) 
-1.045*** 
(0.128) 
-0.014 
(0.032) 
-0.014 
(0.032) 
LocalSize 0.001 
(0.027) 
0.001 
(0.027) 
0.194 
(0.28) 
0.194 
(0.28) 
0.194 
(0.28) 
0.194 
(0.28) 
0.096** 
(0.046) 
0.096** 
(0.046) 
South_Mexico 0.034** 
(0.017) 
0.034** 
(0.017) 
-0.021 
(0.027) 
-0.021 
(0.027) 
-0.268 
(0.178) 
-0.268 
(0.178) 
0.111** 
(0.049) 
0.111** 
(0.049) 
Centr_Mexico 0.076*** 
(0.022) 
0.076*** 
(0.022) 
-0.139*** 
(0.031) 
-0.139*** 
(0.031) 
0.444* 
(0.256) 
0.444* 
(0.256) 
0.049 
(0.051) 
0.049 
(0.051) 
HouseFloor 0.036*** 
(0.013) 
0.036*** 
(0.013) 
0.042* 
(0.024) 
0.042* 
(0.024) 
0.6*** 
(0.151) 
0.6*** 
(0.151) 
-0.065 
(0.043) 
-0.065 
(0.043) 
PipedWater 0.034*** 
(0.013) 
0.034*** 
(0.013) 
0.01 
(0.025) 
0.01 
(0.025) 
-0.109 
(0.184) 
-0.109 
(0.184) 
0.018 
(0.045) 
0.018 
(0.045) 
DepRatio -0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.009 
(0.01) 
-0.009 
(0.01) 
0.113 
(0.081) 
0.113 
(0.081) 
-0.013 
(0.016) 
-0.013 
(0.016) 
Age -0.001*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0007) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
-0.0009 
(0.001) 
-0.0009 
(0.001) 
Education 0.042** 
(0.018) 
0.042** 
(0.018) 
-0.019 
(0.025) 
-0.019 
(0.025) 
-0.74*** 
(0.154) 
-0.74*** 
(0.154) 
0.046 
(0.045) 
0.046 
(0.045) 
IdioShock 0.064*** 
(0.017) 
0.064*** 
(0.017) 
0.029 
(0.023) 
0.029 
(0.023) 
0.198 
(0.165) 
0.198 
(0.165) 
  
Indigenous -0.057*** 
(0.014) 
-0.057*** 
(0.014) 
-0.004 
(0.022) 
-0.004 
(0.022) 
-1.078*** 
(0.133) 
-1.078*** 
(0.133) 
-0.007 
(0.04) 
-0.007 
(0.04) 
LocalType*D  -0.008  -0.048  -0.918***  -0.052 
LocalSize*D  0.022  0.06  0.937*  -0.171 
South_Mexico*D  0.08**  -0.123**  -1.574***  0.154 
Centr_Mexico*D  0.035  0.007  -0.957**  0.119 
HouseFloor*D  -0.021  0.049  -0.052  -0.092 
PipedWater*D  0.043  0.092*  -0.023  -0.01 
DepRatio*D  0.006  -0.046**  0.179  -0.024 
Age*D  -0.0002  -0.003**  -0.008  -0.002 
Education*D  -0.055  -0.11**  0.278  0.042 
IdioShock*D  -0.013  0.03  -0.555*   
Indigenous*D  -0.048  0.052  -0.582*  -0.1 
Obs. 2456 2456 2454 2454 2456 2456 510 508 
R2 0.045 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.094 0.03 0.045 
 
Notes: heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
Locality size only seems to be associated with impact heterogeneity in the case of remittance 
reception, where more densely populated areas receiving remittances more often when treated. 
Additional heterogeneity affects the frequency of remittance reception depending on households’ 
demographic characteristics such as the age of the household’s head and the dependency ratio. 
In fact, households with younger heads and those with lower dependency ratios seem to benefit 
comparatively more in that they receive remittances more often when treated.  
6.2 Matching estimation 
Once these diverse heterogeneity patterns are uncovered, to ensure that the ATT is only 
calculated over the common support, and that all biases in the covariate distribution are 
eliminated, we resort to matching methods. We rely on a Mahalanobis distance metric approach 
derived above to identify households with similar treatment probabilities, conditional on the set 
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of covariates reported with statistical significance in Table 1. Table A1 in the Appendix presents 
the results from the probit. The findings broadly conform to our expectations in terms of 
significance and direction. 
 
Tables 3-5 present for each outcome, the results obtained with the different matching algorithms 
described in Section 5. In Table 3, the whole sample is considered, while in Tables 4 and 5, the 
fixed effect matching is presented, where the household sample is disaggregated into rural and 
urban locality type. The post-estimation routines proposed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) allow to 
assess the imposed common support, for which details are presented in each table, under the 
ATT result panel. Furthermore, the balancing of the covariate distribution in the treated and 
non-treated groups, and the overall mean bias reduction achieved can also be assessed. These 
details are presented separately in Tables 6-8. 
 
Starting with Table 3, matching on the whole sample indicates that electronic transfer 
programme of Oportunidades decreases the propensity to participate in tandas by between 3.3 
per cent and 4.8 per cent, depending on the estimator. Opportunity and financial costs associated 
with informal saving arrangements, both in terms of time allocation to peer-monitoring of 
savings groups, and implicit risk of losing the funds, may play a role here. Anderson and Baland 
(2002) and Gugerty (2007) argue that ROSCAs may be used as a saving commitment device. 
However, Dupas and Robinson (2013) also show that a savings account in a financial institution 
works in a similar way, by household members, notably women, to keep savings away from 
sharing pressure from relatives or appropriation risks from spouses. In line with these findings, 
our results indicate that there is a relatively small substitution effect between saving portfolio 
choices, with the poor favouring bank accounts over informal saving arrangements. 
 
Interestingly the propensity to save at home, which is the second outcome of interest, does not 
seem to be affected by the provision of a bank account. The fact that households only partly 
substitute informal group savings with bank savings indicates that transaction costs may play an 
important role. The possibility of saving in a bank account provides an alternative to lower 
transaction costs in group savings; however, when transaction costs are minimal or inexistent, as 
in the case of keeping money ‘under the mattress’, no substitution takes place. Our findings are 
in line with those of Aportela (1999). The third outcome of interest is the frequency of 
remittance reception, which does not seem to be influenced by the electronic payment 
programme. However, when the impact specification is carry out using fixed effects estimates 
(see Tables 4 and 5), the results turn out to be positive for rural households. We return to this 
issue in the paragraphs below. 
 
Finally, we find that households who receive the Oportunidades grant in a bank account were 6-
8 per cent more likely to use their savings to cope with idiosyncratic shocks. The increased 
reliance on savings implies in this case that resorting to contracting loan or reducing 
consumption become less frequent. Karlan et al. (2011) point out that when unexpected events 
arise, failure to smooth consumption as a consequence of inadequate financial planning can 
result in households resorting to contracting new debt, or defaulting existing credits. These 
clearly are undesirable consequences, particularly when considering that for Oportunidades 
beneficiaries who live near subsistence level, any reduction in consumption can drastically impact 
health status schooling, work productivity, and also future consumption and income levels. 
Furthermore, as social and financial sanctions usually accompany loan defaults, the improved 
portfolio of copying strategies is a desirable result of the electronic payment programme. 
 
We turn now to the results from the location fixed-effects estimates presented in Tables 4 and 5. 
First, it appears that the decreased participation in tandas is concentrated in the urban sector, 
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with a larger impact magnitude ranging from 8-14 per cent depending on the estimator. The 
finding is not surprising. Rural areas are often scarcely populated and the distance between 
villages can be considerable. This increases transaction and monitoring costs, as well as financial 
risks. In fact, tandas seems to be in Mexico predominantly an urban phenomenon. Klaehn et al. 
(2006) point out that only 7 per cent of the rural population use tandas as a saving instrument.  
 
The impact of the electronic payment on the frequency of remittance reception and coping 
strategies is concentrated in the rural sector. As the frequency of remittance reception is 
expressed in log-form, we take the antilog of the ATT estimate and compute (݁ఊ − 1) × 100 
(Halvorsen and Palmquist 1980) to calculate the percentage change of the median of remittance 
reception of treatment households relative to the control group. Two of the three matching 
algorithms reported in Table 5 indicate that the frequency of remittance reception increases by 
90 per cent in the rural sector, as a result of the bank account provision. To gauge the extent of 
the impact, consider the hypothetical case of a household that receives remittances six times a 
year before the intervention. Following the provision of a bank account, this frequency nearly 
doubles. That is, the same household that received an average of one remittance every two 
months is now able to receive transfers every month. Arestoff and Venet (2011) found similar 
results in Madagascar, where the availability of a mobile-based transaction system translated to an 
increase in frequency of remittance reception.  
 
Travelling distance to branches of BANSEFI and non-banking institutions is likely to be much 
lower than other money transfer providers that are usually located in the nearest town. Indeed, 
BANSEFI and non-banking institutions affiliated to L@ Red de la Gente achieved a very 
extensive territorial coverage, specifically targeting at localities with limited or no access to 
banking services. As a result, transaction and opportunity costs were greatly reduced; which 
translated into an increase in the frequency of remittance reception among those poor 
households that were dependent on money transfers. 
 
The impact of the programme on coping strategies is also found to be concentrated in the rural 
sector. Rural households receiving Oportunidades in a bank account exhibited a higher 
propensity to use their own savings as a coping mechanism against idiosyncratic shocks than 
rural households receiving Oportunidades in cash. The impact is in the order of 8 to 10 per cent. 
The absence of significant impact in urban areas may be driven by the higher incidence of 
idiosyncratic shocks in rural areas and the more pronounced impact on the households that were 
more disadvantaged to start with. 
6.3 Matching quality 
To assess the quality of the results, Tables 6-8 report the mean bias reduction achieved after 
matching, as well as likelihood-ratio test statistics, for all specifications presented in Tables 3-5. 
Table 6 indicates that over 98 per cent of mean bias reduction was achieved in the whole sample 
estimation. For the last outcome, while a smaller average bias exists in the unmatched sample to 
start with, a lower bias reduction of around 85 per cent is achieved after matching. The 
comparison of the likelihood-ratio test statistics and their corresponding p-values for the 
unmatched and matched sample confirms that in the latter no explanatory power is left to the 
covariates. This, in turn, allows us to attribute the differences in outcomes between the treatment 
and control groups to the intervention. Tables 7 and 8 report similar findings with regard to the 
split sample. In particular, the post-estimation bias reduction for urban areas indicates a 95 per 
cent average bias reduction for the first three outcomes, and a bias reduction of 80-90 per cent 
for the fourth outcome. In the rural sample, more than 99 per cent of the bias was eliminated by  
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Table 3: Mahalanobis distance metric and bias-adjusted nearest neighbour matching estimators 
 
                            Tanda   HomeSaving  Remittances  ShockCoping 
 NN 
mahal 
kernel 
weighted 
NN 
bias_adj 
NN 
mahal 
kernel 
weighted 
NN 
bias_adj 
NN 
mahal 
kernel 
weighted 
NN 
bias_adj 
NN 
mahal 
kernel 
weighted 
NN 
bias_adj 
ATT -0.048** 
(0.024) 
-0.033* 
(0.018) 
-0.046** 
(0.021) 
-0.05 
(0.037) 
-0.031 
(0.02) 
-0.053 
(0.035) 
0.114 
(0.238) 
0.03 
(0.16) 
0.106 
(0.129) 
0.08** 
(0.038) 
0.08** 
(0.033) 
0.06* 
(0.033) 
Obs. 2456 2456 2456 2454 2454 2454 2456 2456 2456 510 510 510 
Treated 1200 1097 1399 1198 1095 1099 1200 1200 1413 224 224 264 
Controls 1043 1043 1043 1043 1043 1043 1043 1043 1043 246 246 246 
Comm Supp 2243 2140 2442 2241 2138 2052 2243 2243 2456 470 470 510 
Off sup 213 316 14 213 316 402 213 213 0 40 40 0 
Notes: Abadie and Imbens (2006)’s heteroskedasticity-robust analytical standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 4: Mahalanobis distance metric and bias-adjusted nearest neighbour matching estimators (urban sector) 
 
                            Tanda   HomeSaving  Remittances   ShockCoping  
 NN 
mahal 
kernel 
weighted 
NN 
bias_adj 
NN 
mahal 
kernel 
weighted 
NN 
bias_adj 
NN 
mahal 
kernel 
weighted 
NN 
bias_adj 
NN 
mahal 
kernel 
weighted 
NN 
bias_adj 
ATT -0.1* 
(0.053) 
-0.077* 
(0.046) 
-0.14*** 
(0.05) 
-0.026 
(0.057) 
-0.016 
(0.057) 
-0.071 
(0.052) 
-0.712 
(0.49) 
-0.485 
(0.3) 
-0.427 
(0.26) 
0.036 
(0.064) 
0.024 
(0.062) 
0.024 
(0.062) 
Obs. 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 196 196 196 
Treated 456 433 466 456 433 467 444 444 346 83 87 107 
Controls 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 78 78 78 
Comm Supp 749 717 759 749 717 759 737 717 639 161 175 175 
Off sup 147 170 137 147 170 136 159 159 257 35 21 11 
Notes: Abadie and Imbens (2006)’s heteroskedasticity-robust analytical standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 5: Mahalanobis distance metric and bias-adjusted nearest neighbour matching estimators (rural sector) 
 
                            Tanda   HomeSaving  Remittances   ShockCoping 
 NN 
mahal 
kernel 
weighted 
NN 
bias_adj 
NN 
mahal 
kernel 
weighted 
NN 
bias_adj 
NN mahal kernel 
weighted 
NN 
bias_adj 
NN 
mahal 
kernel 
weighted 
NN 
bias_adj 
ATT -0.019 
(0.021) 
-0.008 
(0.02) 
-0.017 
(0.021) 
-0.035 
(0.044) 
-0.05 
(0.033) 
-0.044 
(0.043) 
0.642*** 
(0.239) 
0.327 
(0.25) 
0.644** 
(0.257) 
0.089** 
(0.041) 
0.079** 
(0.031) 
0.097** 
(0.042) 
Obs. 1560 1560 1560 1558 1558 1558 1560 1560 1560 314 314 314 
Treated 810 752 810 808 750 808 810 752 810 146 134 146 
Controls 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 168 168 168 
Comm Supp 1560 1502 1560 1558 1500 1558 1560 1502 1560 314 302 314 
Off supp 0 58 0 0 58 0 0 58 0 0 12 0 
Notes: Abadie and Imbens (2006)’s heteroskedasticity-robust analytical standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Source: Authors. 
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matching, in all cases. All of the above results are confirmed by a comparison of the pseudo-R2 in the 
unmatched and matched samples. 
 
Nearest neighbour matching, consisting in matching control households only once to the closest 
treated household, incurs in problems with the overlap region, where probability density is very low. To 
avoid such bias, it is possible to allow control observations to be matched more than once to different 
treated units. This option, however, is not exempt from risks. Substantial precision losses can occur 
from certain control observations being used too often. This is typically the case for control 
observations that have very similar characteristics, on average, to most treated units. An indicator of 
matching quality that is illustrative of such trade-off is the weight concentration ratio where weight 
captures the number of treated observations each control observation is matched to. The concentration 
ratio is computed as the sum of weights in the first decile of the weight distribution divided by the total 
sum of weights in the comparison sample (Lechner 2002).  
 
Table 9 reports concentration ratio percentage figures for all nearest neighbour estimations presented 
in Tables 3-5. In this case, for the first three outcomes, in both the whole and rural samples, around 70 
per cent of the control observations are matched to either one or at most two treated units. Slightly 
over 50 per cent of the control units have only one or two treated matches, in the urban sample. These 
results show that the matching quality is high. The last outcome performs slightly worse, just as it did in 
the mean bias reduction case. Here, over 50 per cent of the control observations are matched once or 
twice in the whole and rural samples, but the figure goes down to 20 per cent in the urban sample. 
Note, however, that in the latter instance, the maximum amount of repeated matched pairs 
corresponds to six. So, despite a low concentration ratio, it would be misleading to interpret this as an 
indication of poor matching quality. 
 
Table 6: Matching quality – % mean bias reduction and pseudo R2 (whole sample) 
 
                    Tanda HomeSaving Remittances ShockCoping 
 NN 
mahal 
kernel 
weighted 
NN 
mahal 
kernel 
weighted 
NN 
mahal 
kernel 
weighted 
NN 
mahal 
kernel 
weighted 
Unmatched 
Mean |bias| 
17.35 
(9.92) 
17.35 
(9.92) 
17.35 
(9.94) 
17.35 
(9.94) 
17.35 
(9.92) 
17.35 
(9.92) 
12.94 
(10.07) 
12.94 
(10.07) 
Matched 
Mean |bias| 
0.5 
(1.55) 
0.226 
(0.506) 
0.47 
(1.46) 
0.23 
(0.515) 
0.5 
(1.55) 
0.668 
(1.51) 
2.14 
(4.27) 
1.65 
(4.29) 
Unmatched 
Pseudo R2 
0.101 
(0.000) 
0.108 
(0.000) 
0.102 
(0.000) 
0.108 
(0.000) 
0.101 
(0.000) 
0.108 
(0.000) 
0.078 
(0.000) 
0.069 
(0.000) 
Matched 
Pseudo R2 
0.000 
(0.996) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(0.998) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(0.996) 
0.001 
(0.999) 
0.005 
(0.978) 
0.004 
(0.993) 
Source: Authors. 
 
Table 7: Matching quality – % mean bias reduction and pseudo R2 (urban sample) 
 
              Tanda HomeSaving Remittances ShockCoping 
 NN 
mahal 
kernel 
weighted 
NN 
mahal 
kernel 
weighted 
NN 
mahal 
kernel 
weighted 
NN 
mahal 
kernel 
weighted 
Unmatched 24.01 24.01 24.01 24.01 24.01 24.01 21.76 21.76 
Mean |bias| (13.51) (13.51) (13.52) (13.52) (13.51) (13.51) (13.32) (13.32) 
Matched 0.178 0.178 0.178 0.178 0.178 0.178 0.178 0.178 
Mean |bias| (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unmatched 
Pseudo R2 
1.22 
(2.96) 
1.52 
(3.32) 
1.22 
(2.96) 
1.52 
(3.32) 
1.04 
(2.35) 
1.69 
(3.63) 
2.18 
(5.94) 
4.95 
(9.11) 
Matched 
Pseudo R2 
0.002 
(0.984) 
0.003 
(0.977) 
0.002 
(0.984) 
0.003 
(1.000) 
0.001 
(0.998) 
0.003 
(0.955) 
0.011 
(0.956) 
0.019 
(0.857) 
Source: Authors. 
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Table 8: Matching quality – % mean bias reduction and pseudo R2 (rural sample) 
 
           Tanda HomeSaving Remittances ShockCoping 
 NN 
mahal 
kernel 
weighted 
NN 
mahal 
kernel 
weighted 
NN 
mahal 
Kernel 
weighted 
NN 
mahal 
kernel 
weighted 
Unmatched 14.01 14.01 14.06 14.06 14.01 14.01 12.42 12.42 
Mean |bias| (13.05) (13.05) (13.03) (13.03) (13.05) (13.05) (8.37) (8.37) 
Matched 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.046 0.046 
Mean |bias| (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.018) 
Unmatched 
Pseudo R2 
1.97 
(1.46) 
0.965 
(2.49) 
1.99 
(1.48) 
0.968 
(2.50) 
1.97 
(1.46) 
0.965 
(2.49) 
5.11 
(5.98) 
4.14 
(6.19) 
Matched Pseudo 
R2 
0.002 
(0.951) 
0.002 
(0.971) 
0.002 
(0.948) 
0.002 
(0.97) 
0.002 
(0.951) 
0.002 
(0.971) 
0.012 
(0.858) 
0.011 
(0.897) 
Source: Authors. 
 
 
Table 9: Matching quality – % concentration ratio (nearest neighbour estimation) 
 
 Tanda HomeSaving Remittances ShockCoping 
whole sample 69 68.5 69.5 52.6 
urban sample 56 56 56 22 
rural sample 71.3 73 72 57.5 
 
Source: Authors. 
6.4 Sensitivity analysis 
Although self-selection into treatment is not a source of concern in our study, we do not have an 
experimental design. Therefore, it is important to test the robustness of our quasi-experimental set-up 
in the presence of any potential unobserved confounder. In this section we test the robustness of our 
results to possible deviations from the main assumption upon which matching estimators rely, i.e. the 
Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA).  
 
To do this, we apply the test developed by Ichino et al. (2008), whereby the ATTs estimated via nearest 
neighbour estimation are reproduced by repeated simulations of the underlying models, where a 
confounder variable is included among the matching covariates.6 The comparison of the results 
obtained with and without matching on the simulated confounder is an indication of the extent to 
which the baseline results are sensitive to a violation of the CIA. The confounder is specified as a 
binary variable U, setting treatment status equal to ଴ܶ, ଵܶ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ and assuming for simplicity a binary 
outcome ଴ܻ, ଵܻ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ.7 The distribution of U is fully defined by a set of four probability parameters: 
 
݌௜௝ ≡ ܲݎ	(ܷ = 1|ܶ = ݅, ܻ = ݆) = ܲݎ	(ܷ = 1|ܶ = ݅, ܻ = ݆,ܹ) 
with ݅, ݆ ∈ ሼ0, 1ሽ, which represents the probability that a confounder U exists in each of the four 
groups defined by treatment and outcome status. In the above, conditional independence of U with 
respect to W is assumed. By adopting a grid-search approach, various configuration sets of the ݌௜௝  
probability parameters can be tested, with the aim to find the one that drives the ATT to zero. Ichino 
et al. (2008) show, first, that if ݀ = ݌01 − ݌00 > 0, that is, if 	ܲݎ( ଴ܻ = 1|ܶ = 0,ܷ = 1,ܹ) >
ܲݎ	( ଴ܻ = 1|ܶ = 0,ܷ = 0,ܹ), a confounding factor that has a positive impact on the untreated 
outcome ଴ܻ (conditioning on ܹ) is simulated. Second, they show that, when ݏ = ݌1.−	݌0. > 0, that 
                                                
6 An ad hoc routine was developed using as a basis the readily available Stata programme developed by Ichino et al. (2008). 
This was done is order to adapt the sensitivity test to our own estimation analysis. A drawback is that the simulation of the 
ATTs estimated via kernel-weighted matching methods is too cumbersome. This is why only ATT simulations based on 
nearest neighbour baselines are reported. 
7 The discussion extends to continuous treatment cases. 
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is, when 	ܲݎ(ܶ = 1|ܷ = 1,ܹ) > ܲݎ	(ܶ = 1|ܷ = 0,ܹ), the simulated confounding factor has a 
positive effect on treatment assignment (conditioning on ܹ). As the choice of probability parameters 
is discretionary, we follow Nannicini (2007) and fix the value of the difference ݌11 − ݌10, while 
varying ݀ and	ݏ to identify what combination represents a real threat to the ATT. 
 
Table 10 reports the ATTs simulated when a confounding factor ܷ, defined by each of the selected 
configuration sets, is included in the model. Following Nannicini (2007), the configuration sets are 
specified so as to represent an increasingly dangerous confounder. The first set is characterized by 
relatively smaller ݀ and ݏ differences with ݌11 and ݌10 equal to 0.7 and ݀=0.2, while the last 
represents a large outcome effect with ݀=0.5. In all instances, outcomes are remarkably stable. We 
conclude, therefore, that unobservable factors do not pose a threat to our results. 
 
Table 10: Sensitivity analysis 
 
 Tanda HomeSaving Remittances ShockCoping 
ATT Whole Urban Rural Whole Urban Rural Whole Urban Rural Whole Urban Rural 
Baseline -0.048** 
(0.024) 
-0.1* 
(0.053) 
0.019 
(0.021) 
-0.05 
(0.037) 
-0.026 
(0.057) 
-0.035 
(0.044) 
0.114 
(0.238) 
-0.712
(0.49)
0.642*** 
(0.239) 
0.08** 
(0.038) 
0.036 
(0.064) 
0.089**
(0.041)
p11,p10
= 0.7 
d = 0.2 
-0.048** 
(0.024) 
-0.127* 
(0.088) 
0.019 
(0.02) 
-0.049 
(0.037) 
-0.026 
(0.057) 
-0.036 
(0.045) 
0.115 
(0.236) 
-0.712
(0.49)
0.642*** 
(0.24) 
0.08** 
(0.038) 
0.036 
(0.064) 
0.089**
(0.041)
p11,p10
= 0.8 
d = 0.3 
-0.048** 
(0.024) 
-0.127* 
(0.088) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.049 
(0.037) 
-0.026 
(0.057) 
-0.036 
(0.045) 
0.125 
(0.24) 
-0.713
(0.49)
0.642*** 
(0.24) 
0.08** 
(0.038) 
0.036 
(0.064) 
0.089**
(0.042)
p11,p10
= 0.8 
d = 0.5 
-0.048** 
(0.024) 
-0.101* 
(0.053) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.049 
(0.037) 
-0.026 
(0.057) 
-0.036 
(0.045) 
0.124 
(0.24) 
-0.713
(0.49)
0.642*** 
(0.24) 
0.08** 
(0.038) 
0.036 
(0.064) 
0.089**
(0.042)
 
Notes: standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Source: Authors. 
7 Conclusions 
This study analyses a case of financial innovation in social service delivery, which was implemented in 
Mexico in the context of the cash transfer programme Oportunidades. Currently, nearly all Oportunidades 
beneficiaries receive the transfer electronically. The possibility of using a rich household-level dataset—
representative at the three main regions of Mexico—that was collected during the phase-in of the 
programme gave us the opportunity to construct a quasi-experimental design that in turn, allowed us to 
evaluate the impact of the electronic payment system.  
 
Our findings clearly indicate important distinctions in policy impact between rural and urban areas. The 
decreased participation in informal saving arrangements was limited to urban settings, where tandas 
most often take place. In the rural sector; however, Oportunidades beneficiaries who receive their income 
supplement in a bank account received remittances more frequently. They also appeared more likely to 
cope with idiosyncratic shocks using their own savings, as opposed to contracting loans or reducing 
consumption levels.  
 
Our results can be associated with two strands of literature. First, the role of transaction costs in 
interpreting the substitution effect between formal and informal savings particularly tandas, which 
involve costs in terms of peer-monitoring, organization effort, and risks of insolvency. This may 
explain why, when provided with a bank account, households’ participation in tandas decreases. 
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In rural areas, lack of access to financial services represents a supply constraint and translates into high 
transaction costs for households wishing to access such services. This seems to explain why the 
provision of a bank account facilitated the access to remittance reception.  
 
Second, the intervention also achieved a shift in households’ choices to cope with idiosyncratic risks. 
The role of savings in deprived communities is often that of insurance against shocks. Debt contraction 
often leads to default and its subsequent negative repercussions; while consumption reduction can 
impair the working potential of the household and lead to future welfare loss. The fact that treatment 
households resorted to their own savings as a shock coping strategy represents an outcome of the 
intervention. The shift away from debt accumulation and consumption reduction to usage of savings is 
likely to reflect improvements in financial planning and consumption smoothing strategies. While the 
availability of quasi-experimental data gave us the opportunity to assess the impact of the electronic 
transfer programme on various wellbeing dimensions, further research is still needed to examine 
longer-term impacts that may not have been materialized within the time window of analysis covered 
by our quasi-experiment. Additional research could go beyond savings portfolio choices, and explore 
changes in saving quantities, and the use of other financial services. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. Probit regressions, marginal effects 
 
 Tanda  HomeSaving Remittances Shock 
Coping 
Tanda  HomeSaving Remittances Shock 
Coping 
Tanda  HomeSaving Remittances Shock 
Coping 
 whole sample urban sample rural sample 
LocalType .136*** 
(.02) 
.138*** 
(.02) 
.136*** 
(.02) 
.107** 
(.045) 
        
LocalSize -.111*** 
(0.036) 
-.111*** 
(0.036) 
-.111*** 
(0.036) 
-.128* 
(0.075) 
-.256*** 
(.049) 
-.256*** 
(.049) 
-.256*** 
(.049) 
-.287*** 
(0.108) 
-.116** 
(0.032) 
-.117** 
(0.032) 
-.116** 
(0.032) 
.044 
(0.113) 
South_Mexico -.336*** 
(.025) 
-.336*** 
(.025) 
-.336*** 
(.025) 
-.336*** 
(.059) 
-.478*** 
(0.042) 
-.478*** 
(0.042) 
-.478*** 
(0.042) 
-.642*** 
(.082) 
-.268*** 
(.032) 
-.268*** 
(.032) 
-.268*** 
(.032) 
-.184** 
(.077) 
Centr_Mexico -.275*** 
(.031) 
-.276*** 
(.031) 
-.275*** 
(.031) 
-.218*** 
(.066) 
-.477*** 
(.054) 
-.477*** 
(.054) 
-.477*** 
(.054) 
-.378*** 
(.114) 
-.192*** 
(.038) 
-.193*** 
(.038) 
-.192*** 
(.038) 
-.157* 
(.084) 
HouseFloor .159*** 
(.025) 
.159*** 
(.025) 
.159*** 
(.025) 
.135** 
(.053) 
.137*** 
(.046) 
.136*** 
(.046) 
.137*** 
(.046) 
.281*** 
(.096) 
.159*** 
(.025) 
.174*** 
(.029) 
.175*** 
(.025) 
.095 
(.066) 
PipedWater .1*** 
(.027) 
.101*** 
(.027) 
.1*** 
(.027) 
.111* 
(.061) 
.053 
(.05) 
.054 
(.05) 
.053 
(.05) 
.1 
(.142) 
.1*** 
(.027) 
.119*** 
(.031) 
.117*** 
(.027) 
.173** 
(.067) 
DepRatio -.043*** 
(.011) 
-.043*** 
(.011) 
-.043*** 
(.011) 
-.011 
(.024) 
-.058*** 
(.016) 
-.058*** 
(.016) 
-.058*** 
(.016) 
-.063 
(.04) 
-.016 
(.015) 
-.016 
(.015) 
-.016 
(.015) 
.015 
(.032) 
Age .001** 
(.0008) 
.001* 
(.0008) 
.001** 
(.0008) 
.001 
(.001) 
.004** 
(.001) 
.004** 
(.001) 
.004** 
(.001) 
.005* 
(.003) 
.000 
(.001) 
.000 
(.001) 
.000 
(.001) 
-.002 
(.002) 
Education .071*** 
(.027) 
.07** 
(.027) 
.071*** 
(.027) 
.003 
(.06) 
.14*** 
(.044) 
.14*** 
(.044) 
.14*** 
(.044) 
.21** 
(.103) 
.012 
(.036) 
.012 
(.036) 
.012 
(.036) 
-.1 
(.08) 
IdioSock -.07*** 
(.024) 
-.07*** 
(.024) 
-.07*** 
(.024) 
 
 
-.1** 
(.004) 
-.1** 
(.004) 
-.1** 
(.004) 
 
 
-.05* 
(.031) 
-.053* 
(.031) 
-.055* 
(.031) 
 
 
Indigenous .245*** 
(.022) 
.245*** 
(.022) 
.245*** 
(.022) 
.19*** 
(.05) 
.164*** 
(.04) 
.166*** 
(.04) 
.164*** 
(.04) 
.3*** 
(.09) 
.29*** 
(.026) 
.29*** 
(.026) 
.29*** 
(.026) 
.162*** 
(.063) 
Obs. 2694 2691 2694 566 1024 1023 1024 223 1670 1668 1670 343 
LR χ2 378.38 379.37 378.38 61.05 225.03 224.94 225.03 63.85 205.1 204.95 205.1 24.95 
p > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Psuedo R2 0.101 0.102 0.101 0.078 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.207 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.053 
 
Notes: * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Source: Authors. 
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Figure A1: Tanda participation: nearest neighbour matching – bias reduction 
 
 
Figure A2: Tanda participation: kernel matching – bias reduction 
 
Figure A3: Tanda participation (urban): nearest neighbour matching – bias reduction Figure A4: Tanda participation (urban): kernel matching – bias reduction 
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Figure A5: Tanda participation (rural): nearest neighbour matching – bias reduction 
 
 
Figure A6: Tanda participation (rural): kernel matching – bias reduction 
 
Figure A7: Home saving: nearest neighbour matching – bias reduction Figure A8: Home saving: kernel matching – bias reduction 
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Figure A9: Home saving (urban): nearest neighbour matching – bias reduction 
 
 
Figure A10: Home saving (urban): kernel matching – bias reduction 
 
Figure A11: Home saving (rural): nearest neighbour matching – bias reduction Figure A12: Home saving (rural): kernel matching – bias reduction 
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Figure A13: Remittances: nearest neighbour matching – bias reduction 
 
 
Figure A14: Remittances: kernel matching – bias reduction 
 
Figure A15: Remittances (urban): nearest neighbour matching – bias reduction Figure A16: Remittances (urban): kernel matching – bias reduction 
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Figure A17: Remittances (rural): nearest neighbour matching – bias reduction 
 
 
Figure A18: Remittances (rural): kernel matching – bias reduction 
 
Figure A19: ShockCoping: nearest neighbour matching – bias reduction Figure A20: ShockCoping: kernel matching – bias reduction 
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Figure A21: ShockCoping (urban): nearest neighbour matching – bias reduction 
 
 
Figure A22: ShockCoping (urban): kernel matching – bias reduction 
 
Figure A23: ShockCoping (rural): nearest neighbour matching – bias reduction Figure A24: ShockCoping (rural): kernel matching – bias reduction 
Source: Authors. 
-40 -20 0 20 40
Standardized % bias across covariates
South_Mexico
LocalSize
DepRatio
PipedWater
Centr_Mexico
IdioShock
LocalType
Educ
Indigenous
HouseFloor
Age
Unmatched
Matched
-40 -20 0 20 40
Standardized % bias across covariates
South_Mexico
LocalSize
DepRatio
PipedWater
Centr_Mexico
IdioShock
LocalType
Educ
Indigenous
HouseFloor
Age
Unmatched
Matched
-10 0 10 20 30
Standardized % bias across covariates
Age
South_Mexico
Educ
Centr_Mexico
IdioShock
LocalType
LocalSize
DepRatio
HouseFloor
PipedWater
Indigenous
Unmatched
Matched
-10 0 10 20 30
Standardized % bias across covariates
Age
South_Mexico
Educ
Centr_Mexico
IdioShock
LocalType
LocalSize
DepRatio
HouseFloor
PipedWater
Indigenous
Unmatched
Matched
